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This paper estimates the price elasticity of demand for alcohol using Health and Retirement Survey
data. To account for unobserved heterogeneity in price responsiveness, we use finite mixture models.
We recover two latent groups, one is significantly responsive to price but the other is unresponsive.
Differences between these two groups can be explained in part by the behavioral factors of risk aversion,
financial planning horizon, forward looking and locus of control. These results have policy implications.
Only a subgroup responds significantly to price. Importantly, the unresponsive group drinks more
heavily, suggesting that a higher price could fail to curb drinking by those most likely to cause negative
externalities. In contrast, those least likely to impose costs on others are more responsive, thus suffering
greater deadweight loss yet with less prevention of negative externalities.
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Federal excise taxes on alcohol have not risen since 1991 and the real tax rate has been 
declining. However, many states are now actively considering raising taxes on alcohol to meet 
revenue shortfalls. The rising attention to increasing alcohol taxes may be due to the success of 
state and federal taxes on tobacco in boosting revenue. However, the case for a ‘sin’ tax to 
address externalities is not as strong for alcohol as it is for tobacco because most people drink 
responsibly, without hurting themselves or others. Another reason for taxing potentially 
‘tempting’ goods has emerged relatively recently from the behavioral economics literature. Some 
individuals, especially in some situations, have trouble resisting temptations such as cigarettes or 
cannot resist drinking more than they had planned; this occurs even when the harms associated 
with succumbing ultimately outweigh the benefits of reducing the short term craving. These 
individuals lack the self-control to adhere to their long run preferences over tempting goods. The 
‘sophisticated’ realize that succumbing to temptation does not maximize their long run utility, 
but in the short run, consumption is irresistible (Gruber and Koszegi, 2000). Taxation may serve 
as a pre-commitment device which helps to achieve the consumption level desired according to 
their longer view. (See Gruber and Mullainathan, 2002 and Hersh, 2005 for applications to 
tobacco.) 
The price elasticity of demand for alcohol is a significant determinant of the potential 
welfare effects of increasing alcohol taxes
1. Desired welfare effects may include raising revenue, 
reducing externalities, and acting as a precommitment device to self-control problems. If the goal 
is simply to raise revenue without concern for externalities, then a tax on a good with inelastic 
                                                 
1  Our empirical measure is price. There is evidence that alcohol taxes are at least fully passed through to the 
consumer (Kenkel, 2005; Young and Bielinska-Kwapsisz, 2002). Thus a tax increase results in an almost one to one 
price increase.   4
demand would minimize deadweight loss, ceteris paribus. However, if the goal is to address 
potential negative externalities, a tax on consumption imposing external harm is good policy 
only if demand is responsive to the tax. If the goal is to bolster self-control
2, the criteria are less 
precise, but at least those who desire a precommitment device should bear the tax and should be 
responsive to the tax. An optimal tax might have the greatest impact on those who impose the 
highest externalities (or who most want help with self-control) while having no impact on the 
majority of the drinkers who do not impose negative externalities (or do not seek self-control 
devices)
3. This would reflect heterogeneity of demand across subpopulations.  
While much of the economics literature on alcohol is aimed at youth drinking, we focus 
on older individuals and the potential impact of price on this population. Perhaps owing to the 
fact that many people drink less as they age, there is less research on older drinkers. However, 
older drinkers are an important set of drinkers in part due to critical interactions between alcohol 
and medication and also due to specific diseases being more common in older populations 
(Williams, 1984; Abrams and Alexopoulos, 1977). Further, although older individuals drink less 
than younger ones, they attain higher blood alcohol content for a given amount of alcohol 
consumed and, for any given level of blood alcohol, there is an intensified sensitivity to ethanol 
(Vestal et. al., 1977; Vogel-Sprott and Barrett, 1984). Further, balance, gait and cognition can be 
disturbed by alcohol consumption, and these issues are of greater concern as one ages (Williams, 
1984).  
                                                 
2 Behavioral economics literature on ‘asymmetric paternalism’ (Cameron et al, 2003) ‘opitimal paternalism’ 
(O’Donaghue and Rabin (2003) and others (Bernheim et al 2005) have opened the way for economists to consider 
self-control issues in discussions of optimal tax policy.   
3 We ignore the issue of regressivity.   5
In this paper, we estimate the price elasticity of demand for alcohol explicitly allowing 
for differences by complex sub-groups of individuals. We use a finite mixture model (FMM) 
methodology to allow the price elasticity to vary by latent groups. Specifically, FMM permits 
estimation of price elasticity to vary across complex, latent sub-groups that could not be 
identified by using simple groups such as by age, race, gender or consumption level
4. Further, 
FMM allows prior and posterior characterization of the component groups. Our results suggest 
that important differences in price elasticity are revealed by our FMM approach and that these 
differences are masked in a single equation method that assumes homogeneity in response. By 
characterizing these two groups of individuals, we further find that some of the difference 
between these two latent groups can be explained by differences in risk aversion, locus of control 
and financial planning horizon; the differences are not only due to addiction to alcohol. These 
findings have critical policy applications that we discuss below. 
We add to the literature in multiple dimensions. First, the topic of alcohol taxes is of 
current policy concern given the latest wave of proposed state level tax hikes on alcohol
5.  
Second, our use of FMM allows heterogeneity across latent groups, identifying differences 
which would otherwise be masked by pooling unlikes. The heterogeneity that we find across 
                                                 
4 Methods such as quantile regression allow for heterogeneity in the price elasticity, however they do not 
distinguish between whether the behavior of the individual at the xth percentile has changed or the 
individual at the xth percentile has changed. 
 
5 At least 24 states are considering proposals to raise alcohol taxes. In addition, states are considering 
easing restrictions on alcohol sales to boost tax revenues. Examples of policies under consideration 
include: in Utah, lawmakers are considering ending a 40-year-old law requiring consumers to get a 
license before drinking in a bar; Georgia, Connecticut, Indiana, Texas, Alabama, and Minnesota may end 
Sunday-sales bans and Alabama may allow sale of beer with 13.9% percent, instead of the current 6% 
volume.     Accessed 6-23-09 http://www.jointogether.org/news/headlines/inthenews/2009/state-
loosening-alcohol-laws.html 
   6
latent groups is relevant to policy goals. Third, we examine factors such as locus of control, 
financial planning horizon and risk aversion, thus contributing to the more modern behavioral 
economic literature on optimal taxation of addictive goods. 
Background on price elasticity. 
  There is considerable range in estimates of the price elasticity of demand for alcohol with 
variation likely attributable to data type (aggregated or individual) and source (national, cross-
sectional), age groups (often youths), measure of consumption, price (beer, wine or spirits, 
separately or an average), use of tax rate versus price, econometric methods and other factors. 
Wagenaar et al. (2009) conduct a formal meta-analysis and review of 1003 estimates of the price 
and tax elasticities of demand for alcohol from 112 studies. See also Leung and Phelps (1993) 
Ornstein (1980), Ornstein and Levy (1983) for earlier reviews. Grossman et al. (1998) review the 
evidence for youths specifically. Wagenaar et al. conclude that alcohol prices and tax rates 
significantly reduce consumption of alcohol. Using the simple mean effect across all of the 
studies, they find price elasticities for beer, wine, and spirits to be respectively: -.46, -.69, and -
.80
6. Using more-sophisticated meta-analysis techniques, including weighting the study 
outcomes by the precision of the estimates, they find smaller estimates of the elasticities. 
Specifically they find the elasticities for beer, wine and spirits to be respectively: -.17, -.30 and -
.29. They estimate the overall price elasticity for alcohol to be -.44 based on studies using 
aggregate level data and -.03 for studies using individual level data. For heavy drinkers, the 
elasticity is estimated to be -.28. While these meta-estimates are extremely useful benchmarks, 
there is potential heterogeneity by age, race and tax versus price of alcohol that are masked. For 
example using data from the 1993 NHIS and self-reported number of days with five or more 
                                                 
6  Estimates for price and tax elasticity were not separately delineated.   7
drinks, Kenkel (1996) finds the elasticity of -.5 for men and more than double this for women (-
1.3). For youths, while most studies find that the initiation of use of alcohol, the amount 
consumed conditional on drinking and the overall drinking rate are sensitive to price, statistically 
significant effects are not always found (Chaloupka and Wechsler, 1996). As discussed below, 
Dave and Saffer (2007) find differences by age. 
Two extant studies are more closely related to our current study. Using the National 
Health Interview Survey, Manning et al. (1995) examine whether the price elasticity of demand 
for alcohol varies by consumption levels. Heavy drinkers are hypothesized to be less responsive 
to price than light or moderate drinkers. They use a two-part model to separate the decision to 
drink from the quantity consumed conditional on being a drinker finding an overall price 
elasticity of -.80
7. However, the price elasticity for drinks, conditional on being a drinker is 
insignificantly different from zero while price significantly affects the decision to drink 
(elasticity of -.55). Quantile regression is used to address the question of heterogeneity of 
elasticity across drinkers based on their level of consumption, finding that the most price 
responsive drinkers are the moderate drinkers. The median drinker has a price elasticity of -1.19. 
The lowest quantile drinker has a price elasticity of 0.55 while the heaviest two quantiles have 
elasticities of -0.49 and 0.12 respectively; all but the latter are significant. The gradients on both 
sides of the peak elasticity decline rather abruptly and the upper and lower tails are significantly 
different from the elasticity of the median. Manning et al. conclude that there is heterogeneity in 
the price elasticities and that failure to differentiate these groups could conceal important policy 
relevant information.  
                                                 
7 Their price measure is a weighted national average across beer, wine, and spirits of the price (including 
taxes) per ounce of pure ethanol. They use ACCRA price data and use CPI adjustments. They use the 
national share of each beverage in overall alcohol consumption as weights.   8
The Dave and Saffer (2007) paper relates to our study along several dimensions. 
Specifically, they use both the PSID and the HRS to examine whether the beer tax elasticity of 
demand for alcohol varies by risk preference. They find that a higher risk aversion reduces 
alcohol consumption but that the tax elasticity of demand does not vary by a binary risk 
preference class. Further they find that older individuals are more tax responsive (using beer tax 
measures) than younger individuals (comparing age groups within the PSID). Participation 
elasticity is estimated to be between -.05 and -.04 for younger individuals in the PSID, and -.22 
to -.11 for HRS participants over age 55. Tax elasticities, conditional on being a drinker using 
the average number of drinks per day as the dependent variable, are estimated to be between -.08 
to -.27 depending on the specification. Chronic drinkers have a tax elasticity on this intensive 
margin of -.27 indicating that even heavy drinkers are at least as, if not more, price sensitive than 
other drinkers. This contrasts to the findings of Manning et al. above in which the moderate 
drinkers were found to be the most price sensitive. Both the Manning et al (1995) and 
Dave/Saffer (2007) studies suggest that there may be some heterogeneity in the demand for 
alcohol. We address this directly using the Finite Mixture Model (FMM) approach to allow 
heterogeneity in response across latent groups. The FMM has not been used to estimate price 
elasticities but offers multiple advantages as indicated above.  
Data 
 
We used data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), which is a nationally 
representative longitudinal survey of individuals over 50 years and their spouses. At baseline in 
1992, HRS participants included 12,652 individuals from 7,702 households. Data were originally 
collected through face-to-face interviews, but later interviews were completed by telephone or 
mail. The HRS initially sampled persons in birth cohorts 1931 through 1941 in 1992 and then   9
conducted follow up interviews biennially. In 1998, persons from the 1924 to 1930 cohort and 
the 1942 to 1947 cohort were added to the original sample. In 2004, persons from the 1948 to 
1953 cohort were added to the survey. Our study takes data from both the original HRS and 
Version H of the data prepared by RAND.
8  The RAND HRS data is a subset of the HRS data 
containing cleaned versions of several variables. It was created by the RAND Center for the 
Study of Aging with the goal of making the data more accessible to researchers. More detail on 
the HRS is available elsewhere (Juster and Suzman 1995).   
Our sample includes all individuals who were surveyed in 1996 through 2004. We 
exclude observations for which data were missing on any of the following variables: drinks per 
day, state and census region of residence, alcohol price for the corresponding state-year, age, 
race, gender, height and years of education. Our final sample consists of 71,802 observations. 
Dependent Variable. The HRS asked respondents whether they ever drink any alcoholic 
beverages such as wine, beer or liquor. Approximately 46% of the sample answered yes to this 
question. If they answered yes, then they were asked how many drinks they have per day on the 
days that they drink. This question was not asked in the first two waves of the HRS; instead 
respondents were asked for a range of drinks per day in general. Because the questions are not 
consistent, we used data only from the third (conducted in 1996) through seventh wave 
(conducted in 2004) of the survey. For the 71,802 observations in our maximum sample, the 
average number of drinks is 0.62. 
Independent Variables. We controlled for age, race, gender, height in meters, income and 
marital status, and years of education. To allow for nonlinear effects of age, we created the 
following age categories: 46 to 55, 56 to 65, 66 to 75, 76 to 85 and 86 plus. The reference 
                                                 
8 The RAND HRS Data file is a longitudinal data that includes the most frequently used HRS variables. It 
was developed at RAND with funding from the National Institute on Aging and the Social Security 
Administration.   10
category was 45 or less. We also included binary indicators for the individual’s census region of 
residence and also wave (year). The reference group for census region was Pacific and for year 
was 1996. Summary statistics are shown in table 1.  
Alcohol Price. We merged the HRS data with state level data on prices on wine, beer and 
spirits.  The prices were standardized per ounce of ethanol using standard drink size for each 
wine, beer and spirits and the concomitant ounces of ethanol per drink. Adjustments were made 
for state variation in cost of living and prices were adjusted for inflation over time.
9 In our 
primary results, the three prices were equally weighted to develop an average price rate measure. 
We take the log of this average price to obtain the variable, log average price.
10  In robustness 
checks, price on each beer, wine and spirits were entered separately. 
Risk Aversion. To measure risk preferences the HRS asked respondents to choose among 
four different gambles. The first gamble was presented as follows:  “Suppose you are the only 
income earner in the family, and you have a good job … You are given the opportunity to take a 
new and equally good job, with a 50-50 chance that it will double your income and a 50-50 
chance that it will reduce your income by a third. Would you take the new job?” If the answer 
was “no,” the respondent was presented with the second gamble: “Suppose the chances were a 
50-50 chance that it would double your income and a 50-50 chance that it would cut your income 
by 20 percent. Would you still take the new job?” If the answer to the first question was “yes”, 
                                                 
9  We are grateful to Michael French and his colleagues at University of Miami for sharing their data on 
prices. The alcohol price data have been adjusted by the cost of living; alcohol is measured as per ounce 
of ethanol. ACCRA is the original source of data.  State level data were calculated by averaging the 
figures from one or more cities within each state.  The data are also available online from the National 
Tax foundation. We adjusted for inflation over the years. 
10 The prices have been handled in a variety of different ways in the literature. For example, Manning et 
al. (1995) weighted their price index using national data on the relative consumption of each beer, wine 
and spirits. However, these national averages are not necessarily representative of consumption patters for 
those over 50. 
   11
the interviewer asked: “Suppose the chances were a 50-50 chance that it would double your 
income and a 50-50 chance that it would cut your income by half. Would you still take the new 
job?” See Barsky et al. 1997 for more information on this variable and its validity.  
Based on their choices, we created a risk aversion variable that took the value 1 if the 
individual chose the most risky gamble (50-50 chances of doubling their income or reducing it 
by half); 2 if they chose the job with even chances of doubling their income or reducing it by a 
third; 3 if they chose the job with even chances of doubling their income or reducing it by a fifth; 
and 4 if they chose to stay with their current job.  
These questions were not asked in the 1994 and 1996 waves of the HRS and were also 
not asked if the interview was by proxy. Note that when we include measures of risk aversion 
our sample size is smaller. From 1998 onwards, only some respondents were selected to answer 
these questions based on their cohort, age and/or random selection
11. We treated risk aversion as 
a time-invariant trait and used an approach that replaces the missing information with data from 
the previous wave for each individual. For persons who answered these questions in more than 
one wave, we took the mean of their answers.  
Financial Planning Horizon. To measure planning behavior, the HRS asked respondents: 
“In deciding how much of your (family) income to spend or save, people are likely to think about 
different financial planning periods. In planning your (family’s) savings and spending, which of 
the time periods listed in the booklet is most important to you [and your 
(husband/wife/partner)]?” We created a variable that took the value 1 if they answered “next few 
months”; 2 if they answered “next year”; 3 if they answered “next few years”; 4 if they answered 
“next 5-10 years”; and 5 if they answered “longer than 10 years”.  
                                                 
11 For details see:  http://www.rand.org/labor/aging/dataprod/randhrsh.pdf   12
 The sample of those who are asked the financial planning question is a subset of the full 
sample. These questions were not asked in the 1994 and 1996 waves of the HRS and they were 
not asked if the interview was by proxy. In 1998 and 2000, respondents were selected to answer 
this question based on a combination of their cohort and random selection. In 2002, individuals 
who were 65 years and older were not asked this question. We treated planning horizon as a time 
invariant trait and applied the same approach used for risk attitudes. 
Locus of Control. Locus of control is a concept developed in psychology and refers to the 
extent to which individuals believe that they can, through their own efforts, affect events and 
outcomes in their lives. Individuals with a high internal locus of control believe that events result 
primarily from their own behavior and actions. In 2004, HRS asked about locus of control in a 
self-administered questionnaire that was left behind with some respondents upon completion of a 
core in-person interview. The questionnaire was administered to a random sample of non-
institutionalized respondents and collected information on various psychosocial variables. One 
question asked individuals how often they feel that what happens to them is out of their control. 
Answers were coded on a 4-point scale with 1 representing “often”, 2 representing “sometimes”, 
3 representing “not often” and 4 representing “never”. Individuals were also asked how much 
they agreed or disagreed with the statements: “at home, I feel I have control over what happens 
in most situations” and “I feel that what happens in life is often determined by factors beyond 
control”. Answers were coded on a 6-point scale, with 1 representing ”strongly agree” and 6 
representing “strongly disagree”. 
We used principle component analysis to reduce these three variables to a single factor 
that was increasing in the level of internal control. The factor loaded positively on the first and 
third variables and negatively on the second variable. Since these variables were asked only in   13
2004, we treated the factor as a time invariant variable and attributed the same value to all 
previous waves for each person. This is consistent with the view in psychology that locus of 
control is a personality trait. 
Forward Looking. The 2004 leave-behind questionnaire also asked individuals how much 
they agreed or disagreed with the following statements: “I live life one day at a time and don’t 
really think about the future”, “I enjoy making plans for the future and working to make them a 
reality” and “some people wander aimlessly through life, but I am not one of them”. Answers 
were coded on a 6-point scale with 1 representing “strongly agree” and 6 representing “strongly 
disagree”. We recoded the latter two variables so that 1 represented “strongly disagree” and 6 
represented “strongly agree”. Next, we used principle component analysis to create a single 
factor that loaded positively on all three variables. A higher value of this factor represents a more 
future oriented attitude
12. For this factor too, we attributed the same value to previous waves for 
each individual.  
 CESD  Score.  The RAND-HRS data included an abridged version of the Center for 
Epidemiologic Studies-Depression (CESD) Scale (Radloff 1977). This validated score is based 
on eight questions that asked the respondent if during the past week they: felt depressed, felt that 
everything did was an effort, experienced restless sleep, could not get going, felt lonely, felt sad 
much of the time, enjoyed life and was happy. The variable is a count of the number of 
symptoms of depression. 
Binge Drinking. The HRS asked respondents the number of days that they had four or 
more drinks on one occasion, in the last three months.   
 
Econometric Methods 
                                                 
12 The factor loadings for locus of control and forward looking attitudes are not presented here but are available 
upon request.   14
We estimate the basic econometric model for number of drinks per day (DRINKS), an 
integer valued variable, using the following approach: 
( | , ) exp( ) ii i i i E DRINKS PRICE PRICE α β ′ =+ XX                (1) 
 Where,  i PRICE  is the logarithm of the average alcohol price corresponding to 
observation i.  Socioeconomic characteristics are denoted by X. Equation (1) is first estimated by 
Poisson regression. In the Poisson model, the coefficient α is the price elasticity of alcohol 
consumption. However, if DRINKS is drawn from distinct subpopulations, the Poisson estimate 
of α is the average of the effects across subpopulations and may hide substantive differences in α 
across the subpopulations.  Thus, we also estimate equation (1) using a finite mixture model with 
Poisson-distributed subpopulations. 
In the finite mixture model, the random variable y is postulated as a draw from a 
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Where,  exp( ) jij i i j PRICE λ αβ ′ =+ X . Other applications of mixture models include 
Morduch and Stern (1997) and Conway and Deb (2002) who used a mixture of normal densities,   15
while an early application of finite mixture of Poisson densities is Wang, Cockburn and 
Puterman (1998).  
The likelihood function corresponding to the constant probability model is: 
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 The finite mixture models are estimated using maximum likelihood and cluster-corrected 
robust standard errors are used throughout for inference purposes. These are implemented using 
the Stata package fmm. Starting from the initial estimates of component proportions π j, we re-
estimate the finite mixture model assuming a (prior) component probability of the form: 
1
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The prior component probability now depends on observables Z and so varies across 
observations. This model assumes that individuals with varying observable characteristics might 
have different probabilities of belonging to either component. The likelihood function 
corresponding to the variant probability model is: 
( ) ,( | ) ( | ) ji j i
j i
Lf y δπ δ = ∑ ∏ θ Z θ                                 (6) 
 
The finite mixture model provides a natural and intuitively attractive representation of 
heterogeneity in a finite, usually small, number of finite mixtures latent classes, each of which 
may be regarded as a ‘type’, or a ‘group’. The results of two studies (Heckman and Singer 1984; 
Laird 1978) suggest that estimates of such finite mixture models may provide good numerical 
approximations even if the underlying mixing distribution is continuous. In addition, the finite   16
mixture approach is semiparametric—it does not require any distributional assumptions for the 
mixing variable—and under suitable regularity conditions is the semiparametric maximum 
likelihood estimator of the unknown density (Lindsay 1995).  Econometric applications of finite 
mixture models include the seminal work of Heckman and Singer (1984) to labor economics, 
Wedel, et al. (1993) to marketing data, El-Gamal and Grether (1995) to data from experiments in 
decision making under uncertainty, and Deb and Trivedi (1997) to the economics of healthcare. 
Finite mixture models have received increasing attention in the statistics literature as well (see 
McLachlan and Peel, 2000, and Lindsay, 1995, for numerous applications). 
A finite mixture characterization is especially attractive if the mixture components have a 
natural interpretation. However, this is not essential. A finite mixture may be simply a way of 
flexibly and parsimoniously modeling the data, with each mixture component providing a local 
approximation to some part of the true distribution. A caveat to the foregoing discussion is that 
the finite mixture model may fit the data better simply because outliers, influential observations 
or contaminated observations are present in the data. The finite mixture model will capture this 
phenomenon through additional mixture components. Hence it is desirable that such models be 
supported both by a priori reasoning and by meaningful a posteriori differences in the behavior 
of the latent classes. 
We use our finite mixture parameter estimates to calculate the posterior probability of 
being in each of the latent classes. We use Bayes’ Theorem to calculate the posterior probability 
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Thus the posterior probability varies across observations. We use the estimated posterior 
probabilities to explore the determinants of class membership. 
Two potentially attractive alternative econometric strategies are worth discussing, the use 
of quantile regression methods, and dealing with the large fraction of zeros using two part 
models. Quantile regressions have been used in similar contexts to study heterogeneous 
responses to treatments but they have two limitations vis-à-vis finite mixture models. First, 
quantile regressions are not well behaved in the context of count data. Second, although quantile 
regression methods may detect heterogeneous responses, they provide no way to characterize the 
source of the heterogeneity.   
Two part models are ubiquitous in the health economics literature to deal with potential 
heterogeneity between users and non-users when the distribution of the outcome includes a 
substantial fraction of zeros. Although our data do include a substantial fraction of zeros, the 
two-part model is less attractive than the finite mixture for two reasons. First, the two-part model 
may be thought of as a special case of the finite mixture model in which one of the components 
has a degenerate distribution at zero. Second, to the extent that some individuals are occasional 
drinkers who go back and forth between no drinks and light drinking, the distinction between use 
and non-use may be less attractive than the distinction between low and high use, which is the 





Using our full sample to estimate a single Poisson regression, we find that price has a 
significant (p<0.001) impact on the number of drinks consumed with a coefficient of -0.286   18
(Table 2, column 1). This estimate falls within the range of estimates from Wagenaar et al. When 
we estimate the FMM allowing for two latent components, we find that for the first and largest 
group (75.4% of the sample), price also has a significant impact on the number of drinks 
consumed (p <0.001) with a coefficient of -1.600 (Table 2, column 2). In contrast, for the 
second, smaller group (24.6% of the sample), price is not significant and the coefficient is -0.035 
(Table 2, column 3). The differences between these two groups in both the significance and 
magnitude of impact are striking. This evidence suggests that the single component model is 
composed of two unlike groups. The larger group (Component 1) consumes 0.129 drinks per day 
on average, while the smaller group (Component 2) has an average consumption of 1.879 drinks 
per day. This heterogeneity is masked in the single equation estimation approach. The prior 
probability equation (Table 2, column 4) indicates that individuals who are younger, more 
educated, male and white are more likely to belong to the latent Component 2.  
Other Independent Variables. Education is significant in all regressions in Table 2 
(p<0.001) and increases the number of drinks in the single Poisson equation and in the sub-
population, Component 1. Further, those with higher education are less likely to be in 
Component 1, suggesting that education may be positively correlated with the number of drinks. 
However, the impact of education is, perhaps surprisingly, negative for those in Component 2. 
These results suggest that education is associated with more drinks in general and for those in the 
group with the lower level of drinking, and education is associated with an increased likelihood 
of being in the heavy drinking group. However, for those in this higher drinking group, the 
impact of education is to reduce the number of drinks. The FMM results generally support 
previous studies suggesting that for adults, education increases drinking on average, but these 
results suggest a more complicated picture. More educated individuals may be more likely to   19
drink, but less likely to drink to overindulge. 
Each of the set of the age dummies is negative and significant in the single equation 
Poisson estimate, with the impact increasing with higher ages (the youngest age category is 
omitted). Similarly, for those in Component 2, as one ages, the number of drinks declines. Also, 
the probability of being in Component 1 increases with age. For those in Component 1, however, 
age is insignificant. Thus the FMM results indicate a more complicated role for age as compared 
to the single equation results that suggest simply that the number of drinks decline with age.  
These results also indicate an interesting role for gender in affecting the number of 
drinks. As would be expected, males are found to be significantly more likely to drink in the 
single equation regression and this same relationship is found for those in Component 2. Also, 
males are significantly less likely to be in Component 1. However, gender is insignificant for 
those in Component 1, as seen in column 2. Blacks and other races are found to drink fewer 
drinks in the single equation regression as well as in Components 1 and 2 and more likely to be 
in Component 1.  
Posterior Probability. In the prior probability equation of Table 2, we use a basic set of 
socio-economic variables (e.g. age, race and gender) to classify observations into the latent 
subgroups. Using the established groups, we then use a richer set of variables to characterize the 
two latent components. Our descriptive analysis of posterior probabilities (shown in Table 3) 
aims to identify factors that are correlated with group membership. Some of the variables that are 
of interest to us due to behavioral economic concepts (e.g. locus of control) are available only in 
much smaller subsets of the HRS. 
Drawing on some of the literature in behavioral economics, we hypothesized that locus of 
control, risk-aversion, length of planning horizon and forward looking attitudes would affect the   20
likelihood of individuals’ sorting into each component. We find that higher risk aversion is 
significantly and positively associated with an increased likelihood of being in Component 1 as 
expected. Intuitively, those who are more risk averse tend to avoid the risky behavior of heavy 
drinking and associated harmful behaviors and outcomes (e.g. drunk driving resulting in traffic 
crashes and impaired balance resulting in falls). Longer financial planning horizons are 
significantly associated with a reduced probability of being in Component 1. Those with a long-
term perspective are less affected by current price variations; their decisions are apparently based 
on a longer time horizon. Similarly, those with forward looking attitudes are less likely to be in 
Component 1. Rather surprising to us, locus of control is associated with a decreased likelihood 
of being in Component 2. Locus of control is a measure of ‘internal’ control; it could be that 
people naively believe that they can control their drinking but then do not, or could be that they 
are in control. Locus of control is not a good measure of self-control per se, but such a measure 
is not available in the data.   
We find that depression increases the likelihood of being in Component 1. This finding is 
consistent with less social interaction due to depression and in turn a lower drinking rate. This 
finding is also consistent with the finding in Saffer and Dave, 2005, indicating that individuals 
with mental disorders are more sensitive to tax. We include a measure of binge drinking (the 
number of days in the last three months that the individual had four or more drinks on one 
occasion) to determine whether the components are synonymous with binge drinking. While 
binge drinkers are significantly less likely to reside in Component 1, the inclusion of this 
indicator has little impact on the significance and sign of the other independent variables. Note 
that the sample size in the posterior specification varies due to limits in the number of 
observations available for each of these less standard variables.   21
Robustness Checks. We conduct several different types of robustness checks. We find 
qualitatively similar results across the alternative specifications. In Table 4, we compare across 
specifications using alternative sets of covariates. In the first three columns, we display the 
results of the two component FMM estimates including risk aversion and financial planning 
horizon directly in the component price elasticity regressions rather than only in the posterior 
probability. Note that the sample size when these variables are included is substantially reduced 
(32,989 instead of the larger 71,802), as these questions were not asked of the full population. 
Locus of control and forward looking attitudes are not included in the FMM regressions of 
drinks due to the much smaller sample size.  
When planning horizon and risk aversion are entered directly into the DRINKS equation, 
the qualitative results still hold. Price elasticity is significant and fairly large (-1.464) in 
Component 1, while it is insignificant (and small) in the second. The price elasticity of 
Component 1 is similar to our previous estimates, but we would not expect it to be exactly the 
same due to the smaller sample. Risk aversion is negative and significant in Component 1, 
indicating that those who are most risk-averse drink fewer drinks, cet. par. This mirrors the 
qualitative result in Dave and Saffer (2007). Risk aversion is insignificant in Component 2. 
Financial planning horizon is significant in both components; however, it is positive in 
Component 1 but negative in Component 2. These qualitative results of opposing impacts are 
similar to those found for education, in that a longer financial planning horizon makes one less 
likely to be in Component 1 (from Table 3), but more likely to drink more conditional on being 
in this component and less likely to drink more for those in Component 2.  
The second set of FMM results in Table 4 includes state level drunk driving laws. We   22
include these laws to test for the impact of state sentiment.
13  Inclusion of these laws helps to 
address the possibility that differences in tax rates and levels of alcohol consumption are 
determined by differences across state in sentiment toward alcohol consumption, which could 
bias the results. Because zero tolerance laws affect only those under age 18, this may be the 
purest control, as it could not have a direct impact on alcohol consumption by older individuals. 
Estimates of the price elasticity are changed very little by inclusion of these proxies for state 
sentiment. 
The next set of checks examines the number of components. We initially investigated a 
FMM specification with two heterogeneous groups. Then we tested to determine whether one, 
two or three components would better represent the underlying relationships. The test criteria for 
each model are reported in Table 5 while the resulting price elasticities can be seen in Table 6. 
We use several criteria in selecting the best model: AIC/BIC and appropriate mechanism of the 
estimation approach. The AIC/BIC reveal that the one component Poisson regression is inferior 
to a specification with multiple components. This is consistent with our finding that there are two 
groups with importantly different price elasticities. As a comparison, we allow three groups in 
the FMM specification. The three component model did not converge.   
In an alternative two-component approach, rather than using only latent groups we 
deleted all the individuals who reported no drinking over the full set of waves in which they were 
in the data
14. Then we estimated a two-component FMM model. We deleted those who do not 
drink over all waves on the grounds that they were dedicated non-drinkers and including them in 
                                                 
13 Kenkel (1996) also uses state laws related to alcohol availability and drunk driving countermeasures as 
explanatory variables for alcohol demand. 
14 The HRS asked respondents whether they ever drink alcoholic beverages. Unfortunately, it is not clear whether 
this question refers to consumption over the individual’s lifetime or current consumption. Further, it is well known 
that individuals tend to under-report alcohol consumption in such surveys. Thus, we defined non-drinkers as those 
who answered no in every survey interview.  
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the regressions would mask the true price elasticity for light drinkers. Otherwise, light drinkers 
and non-drinkers would likely be included together in the two-component model. In the preferred 
two-component FMM specification found in Table 2, rather than deleting the ‘dedicated non-
drinkers’ we allowed the estimation approach to determine the composition of the latent classes.  
Non-drinkers are considered to be at risk of becoming drinkers. 
The price elasticities associated with the different model specifications are displayed in 
Table 6. The qualitative conclusions that we draw from all specifications of the FMM models are 
similar. We consistently find that, 1) price is significant for Component 1; 2) the price elasticity 
is larger in this component as compared to the single equation Poisson estimate and 3) price is 
insignificant in the other component(s). Further, the first component is the largest group, and it 
comprises about 75% of the population except when we delete the nondrinkers. Thus the 
qualitative results from our preferred model are robust to alternative specifications. Estimated 
price elasticities range from -0.926 to -1.600 for the full sample. Even the lowest elasticity is 
more than double that of the Poisson regression (-.268). 
Also displayed in Table 6 are FMM results with alternative price measures. Instead of 
using the average price per ounce of ethanol, we enter price on each beer, wine and spirits in 
separate regressions. We find that the qualitative results remain the same. That is, the alcohol 
price is significant and negative only in Component 1. Also, for this group the elasticity is either 
greater than one (for beer and wine) or very close to one (for liquor). Specifically, the elasticities 
for Component 1 are -1.128, -1.515 and -.926 for beer, wine and liquor respectively. 
Limitations. The results of this study are subject to several limitations. First, the number 
of drinks per day is the dependent variable. This measure does not capture all aspects of 
consumption (i.e. it does not capture days drinking). However, drinks per day may be a good   24
proxy for the most problematic drinking as it is the number of drinks per occasion that engenders 
risky behavior. Some studies have also used drinks per day as their key measure of alcohol 
consumption (Kenkel 1996), while others have used this measure in a two-part model. Second, 
we are unable to differentiate between consumption of beer, wine, and spirits. Third, alcohol 
prices may be measured with some error and may be endogenous in the sense that higher demand 
may result in higher market prices
15 (Manning, et al. 1995). Fourth, for some of the behavioral 
economics variables, there were too few observations for our results to conclusively demonstrate 
the variables’ effects. However, our preliminary results may prompt further interest in behavioral 
economics variables. In addition, the findings of this analysis are limited to older individuals 
while related research has typically focused on youths. Policymakers must consider the impact 
on the entire population. 
 
Discussion 
We find that there is important heterogeneity in the impact of alcohol price on alcohol 
consumption. For the majority of individuals, price is a significant determinant of demand for 
alcohol and these individuals are highly sensitive to price. For the other, smaller group, which 
consumes more alcohol, prices do not significantly affect consumption rates. Females, those with 
lower education, non-whites, and older individuals are more likely to be in the larger, high 
elasticity, low consumption group (Component 1). We also find that members of Component 1 
are more likely to be risk averse, and have a shorter financial planning horizon.  
Our results are in contrast to most of the earlier studies in this area, specifically because 
we identify a very price elastic group as well as find a group that does not respond significantly 
                                                 
15  While endogeneity and measurement error may bias the  results, this would apply to both components of the 
FMM.   25
to prices. As indicated above, Wagenaar et al. (2009) find the average alcohol price/tax elasticity 
to be -.03 across a large number of studies using individual level data
16.  Dave and Saffer (2007), 
find that chronic drinkers have a significant tax elasticity on the intensive margin of -.27.   
Manning et al. (1995) conclude that moderate drinkers are the most price sensitive, more so than 
heavier or lighter drinkers. Our estimate of a price elasticity of -1.6 is somewhat similar to the 
Manning et al. price estimate of -1.19 for the median drinker in quantile regressions; however, 
our estimate is based on Component 1 only.   
Our finding that, among older adults, heavier drinkers are those who have inelastic 
demands for alcohol has important welfare implications for alcohol tax policy. The standard 
welfare approach would suggest (considering only efficiency conditions and ignoring 
distributional issues) that for most goods, higher taxes should be levied, ceteris paribus, on goods 
that have an inelastic demand. However, in the case of potentially harmful goods, sin taxes are 
levied in part to reduce the potential harms, external and internal, of consumption. For these 
drinkers, under several behavioral economic theories of addiction, taxes could increase welfare 
by serving as a precommitment device that serves to bolster weak self-control. However, our 
results suggest that the heavier drinkers are least likely to respond to the higher taxes, thus 
neither the externality nor ‘internality’
17 justification for higher alcohol taxes is supported by our 
results. Note that those in Component 2 are heavier drinkers, but heavy drinking is only one 
factor in the complex set. 
  This paper adds to the literature in several dimensions. We apply the FMM estimation 
approach to estimating the price elasticity of demand. FMM allows us to unmask important, 
policy relevant heterogeneity in elasticity of demand for alcohol among older individuals. In 
                                                 
16  The estimate is -.44 for studies using aggregate data. 
17 See for example Gruber, 2002, on the concept of internalities, intrapersonal impacts   26
addition, the FMM enable us to explore the impact of behavioral factors on the posterior odds of 
belonging to these heterogeneous latent classes. That is, we do not have to delineate only one, 
race, gender, or quantity of alcohol consumed, but rather can examine the multifaceted 
relationships underlying the latent classes. Figure 1 demonstrates graphically that the 
determination of the two components is not based on drinking status alone; many members of 
Component 2, for instance, consume 0 or 1 drink per day. By examining the posterior probability 
of being in each group, we can examine the impact of behavioral factors on classification into 
components. 
While there is growing support for increased alcohol taxes at the political level, we are 
cautious about the welfare gains to increasing the tax on alcohol with regard to this older group 
of individuals. Prior to making a broad policy statement, we would want to apply our estimation 
approach to the full age spectrum. Nonetheless, we believe that this paper makes an important 
and provocative point and suggests a new approach to identifying heterogeneity in the price 
elasticity of demand for alcohol. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Mean  Std.  Dev. 
Drinks per day  0.616  1.346 
Average price per ounce of ethanol  8.308  1.063 
Age 0 – 45  0.014   
Age 46 – 55  0.147   
Age 56 – 65  0.377   
Age 66 – 75  0.256   
Age 76 – 85  0.155   
Age 86+  0.051   
Black 0.151   
Other race  0.031   
Male 0.419   
Height 1.688  0.101 
Married or partnered  0.675   
Household income (in 10,000 1992 USD)  4.463  7.143 
Years of education  12.073  3.253 
Binge drinking  1.325  8.242 
CESD score  1.512  1.941 
Risk aversion (imputed)  3.301  0.989 
Financial planning horizon (imputed)  2.970  1.131 
Observations 71,802   













   31
 
 















Predicted Densities at Mean(X)
 Component 1  Component 2  32
Table 2. Price Elasticity of the Number of Drinks 






of Component 1 
Log average price  -0.286***  -1.600***  0.0351   
 (0.0918)  (0.345)  (0.134)   
Age 46-55  -0.559***  0.0696  -0.405***  0.274* 
 (0.0632)  (0.367)  (0.112)  (0.162) 
Age 56-65  -0.771***  0.183  -0.532***  0.487*** 
 (0.0619)  (0.368)  (0.112)  (0.161) 
Age 66-75  -1.061***  0.356  -0.721***  0.757*** 
 (0.0628)  (0.369)  (0.112)  (0.164) 
Age 76-85  -1.446***  0.158  -1.084***  0.846*** 
 (0.0648)  (0.368)  (0.117)  (0.175) 
Age 86+  -2.040***  -0.549  -1.573***  0.943*** 
 (0.0824)  (0.426)  (0.187)  (0.277) 
Height 0.231**  1.021*  0.0533  -0.140 
 (0.117)  (0.538)  (0.213)  (0.363) 
Years of education  0.0334***  0.248***  -0.0580***  -0.115*** 
 (0.00281)  (0.0200)  (0.00490)  (0.0111) 
Black -0.332***  -2.636***  -0.122***  0.150** 
 (0.0280)  (0.680)  (0.0443)  (0.0754) 
Other race  -0.180***  -1.980***  0.0913  0.346** 
 (0.0665)  (0.760)  (0.124)  (0.149) 
Male 0.898***  -0.0980  0.460***  -0.897*** 
 (0.0229)  (0.114)  (0.0426)  (0.0756) 
Constant -0.189  -3.171***  1.447***  2.488*** 
 (0.281)  (1.172)  (0.466)  (0.599) 
Observations 71,802 71,802 71,802  71,802 
Mean Predicted y    0.129  1.879   
% in Component 1    75.4  24.6   
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regressions also include census region of residence and year dummies 
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Table 3. Determinants of the Posterior Probability of Component 1     
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Age 46-55  0.0502***  0.0509***  0.0411  0.0498***  0.0478*** 
  (0.0133)  (0.0134)  (0.0390) (0.0142) (0.0153) 
Age 56-65  0.0918***  0.0910***  0.104***  0.0883***  0.110*** 
  (0.0131)  (0.0131)  (0.0380) (0.0140) (0.0150) 
Age  66-75  0.141***  0.139***  0.142*** 0.139*** 0.166*** 
  (0.0131)  (0.0131)  (0.0383) (0.0143) (0.0150) 
Age  76-85  0.153***  0.151***  0.134*** 0.146*** 0.175*** 
  (0.0131)  (0.0133)  (0.0390) (0.0155) (0.0151) 
Age  86+  0.159***  0.157***  0.188*** 0.152*** 0.182*** 
  (0.0134)  (0.0136)  (0.0407) (0.0287) (0.0156) 
Height -0.0383**  -0.0305*  -0.120**  -0.0102  -0.0341 
  (0.0179)  (0.0179)  (0.0581) (0.0289) (0.0210) 
Years of education  -0.0191***  -0.0177***  -0.0185*** -0.0174*** -0.0210*** 
 (0.000374)  (0.000392)  (0.00125)  (0.000678)  (0.000455) 
Black 0.0258***  0.0230***  -0.0225  0.0116**  0.0186*** 
 (0.00366)  (0.00371)  (0.0150)  (0.00588)  (0.00435) 
Other race  0.0494***  0.0454***  0.0571**  0.0328***  0.0509*** 
  (0.00739) (0.00744)  (0.0261) (0.0112) (0.00869) 
Male  -0.169***  -0.169***  -0.146*** -0.180*** -0.172*** 
 (0.00366)  (0.00373)  (0.0112)  (0.00601)  (0.00431) 
Married      0.00865***     
    (0.00290)     
Log  income    -0.0108***       
    (0.000970)     
Locus of control      -0.0247***    
     (0.00328)     
Forward looking      -0.00646*     
     (0.00354)     
Risk aversion        0.0102***   
       (0.00198)   
Financialplanning horizon       -0.0126***  
       (0.00188)   
Binge  drinking       -0.0113*** 
        (0.000215) 
CESD  score        0.00865***
        (0.000724) 
Constant  0.970***  1.046***  1.133*** 0.903*** 0.934*** 
 (0.0325)  (0.0334)  (0.101)  (0.0508)  (0.0380) 
Observations 71,802  71,713  8,542  32,989  53,227 
R-squared  0.121  0.123  0.108 0.104 0.214 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 4: FMM Models  
  Component1 Component2 Prior 
Probability of 
Component 1 
Component1 Component2 Prior 
Probability of 
Component 1 
Log average price  -1.464***  0.131    -1.522***  0.0388   
  (0.442) (0.187)   (0.344) (0.136)  
Risk  aversion  -0.113***  0.00190      
  (0.0426)  (0.0153)      
Financial planning 
horizon 
0.248***  -0.0614***      
(0.0436)  (0.0196)      
Blood alcohol 
count law 
   0.0715  0.0123   
   (0.0783)  (0.0276)   
License revocation 
law 
   0.0558  -0.0452   
   (0.125)  (0.0448)   
Zero  tolerance  law     -0.224*  -0.0698*   
     (0.132)  (0.0395)   
Age  46-55  0.159 -0.416***  0.261 0.0725  -0.406***  0.274* 
  (0.380) (0.123) (0.165) (0.361) (0.112) (0.161) 
Age  56-65  0.338 -0.539***  0.482***  0.186 -0.533***  0.487*** 
  (0.385) (0.125) (0.167) (0.362) (0.111) (0.160) 
Age  66-75  0.507 -0.752***  0.795***  0.363 -0.721***  0.761*** 
  (0.403) (0.130) (0.190) (0.363) (0.112) (0.163) 
Age  76-85  0.491 -1.122***  0.760***  0.167 -1.084***  0.851*** 
  (0.422) (0.150) (0.255) (0.363) (0.117) (0.175) 
Age  86+  0.610  0.732*** 3.845*** -0.547  -1.575***  0.941*** 
  (0.559) (0.139) (0.961) (0.424) (0.186) (0.277) 
Height  0.421  0.106  0.0458 1.031* 0.0520 -0.137 
  (0.730) (0.266) (0.499) (0.537) (0.213) (0.363) 
Years  of  education  0.255***  -0.0591*** -0.0815*** 0.247***  -0.0579*** -0.114*** 
  (0.0263) (0.00673)  (0.0149) (0.0200) (0.00491)  (0.0111) 
Black  -3.162*  -0.156*** -0.0398  -2.653*** -0.121*** 0.148** 
  (1.684) (0.0576)  (0.103) (0.691) (0.0445)  (0.0756) 
Other  race  -1.929*  0.0707 0.141  -1.980***  0.0922 0.346** 
  (1.068) (0.180) (0.206) (0.753) (0.123) (0.149) 
Male  -0.0765  0.455*** -0.920***  -0.104  0.459*** -0.901*** 
  (0.154) (0.0536)  (0.105) (0.115) (0.0426)  (0.0758) 
Constant  -3.098* 1.449** 1.835** -3.300***  1.508***  2.484*** 
  (1.656) (0.661) (0.818) (1.175) (0.472) (0.599) 
Observations  32,989 32,989 32,989 71,802 71,802 71,802 
Mean  predicted  y  0.159 2.084   0.129 1.879  
%  in  component  1  0.723 0.277   0.754 0.246  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 












Table 5: Selection Criteria for Various Models 
 Log-likelihood  d.o.f  AIC  BIC 
Poisson -82363.43  24  164774.9  164995.2 
2 component, constant probability   -70321.87  49  140741.7  141191.6 
3 component, constant probability   Not converging       
2 component, variable probability   -69550.2  59  139218.4  139760.1 
Risk/Planning  Model  -35478.15  63  71082.29  71611.74 
Laws Model  -69543.24  65  139216.5  139813.3 
Only drinkers sample (2 











Table 6: Comparison of Price Elasticity Estimates across Models 
  Overall  Component 1  Component 2  Component 3  N 
Poisson  -0.286*** 
(0.0918)     71,802 









3 component, constant probability   Not converging         




































Only drinkers sample (2 









Robust standard errors in parentheses, proportion in component in square brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 